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Abstract
Election observation has spread dramatically, becoming a near rite-of-passage for entry into the
international community. Scholars and democracy promoters often suggest that electoral
observers’ (EOs’) assessments impact public opinion in a straightforward manner, yet, research
on communication caution against these sanguine assumptions. We test the impact of EO
statements on public opinion in two very different contexts using survey experiments conducted
among 3,361 Jordanians and Tunisians. Our results demonstrate the need for democracy
promoters to consider negative consequences when implementing democracy promotion
programs, and for scholars to undertake further research regarding the impacts of election
monitoring on domestic attitudes.
Keywords: Election monitoring, Political communication, Public opinion, Experiments, Middle
East and North Africa
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Introduction
International election observation has spread dramatically since the 1990s, spawning an
industry and becoming a near rite-of-passage for entry into the global community. In 2004,
observers witnessed close to 85% of the elections that took place around the world (Kelley,
2012). There is reason to believe that, as the Carter Center puts it, “Impartial, credible EOs play
a key role in shaping perceptions about the quality and legitimacy of electoral processes” (Carter
Center, 2017). Actors on all sides—incumbents and oppositions, winners and losers—use
observers’ presence and their assessments as ammunition against opponents. Regimes trot out
their invitations to observer missions as evidence that elections will be free, fair, and legitimate,
and after the polls close, those on all sides use monitors’ statements as evidence either to
convince domestic and international communities of the election’s legitimacy, or to draw the
results into question (Marzouk, 2014).
But do such statements actually impact perceptions of domestic audiences? When
residents of a polity hear that observers viewed their elections in a positive or negative light,
does it alter how they themselves view the results of the polls? And, is the impact of election
statements similar across individuals, and in different political contexts?
This paper uses the results of survey experiments conducted in Jordan and Tunisia to
examine how election monitors’ statements may differentially impact opinions of groups within
the country, and also to consider how consistent these impacts are across different political
contexts. While the first questions have begun to be addressed in the literature (see Corstange &
Marinov, 2012, Bush & Prather, 2017, as well as Robertson, 2017 as examples), the last remains
largely untouched, and our cross-national exploration attempts to fill this gap. In our
experimental approach, respondents are randomly placed into conditions describing EOs’
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assessments and asked to what extent they believe the elections represented the will of the
people. In one condition, the question is asked without first reporting an assessment from an
international observer group. In a second condition, the question is preceded by a positive
evaluation from international observers, and in the third condition, it is preceded by a negative
evaluation. This allows us to test the assumption, while often not explicitly expressed, that
international assessments should impact citizens’ perceptions of the elections uniformly—and
namely, that positive statements prompt more positive assessments among all respondents and
negative statements lead to more negative assessments.
The results suggest that the impact of statements varies across citizens within a country,
depending on individuals’ a priori attitudes toward the government, and also across countries,
depending on respondents’ attitudes toward the messenger. These results are in line with insights
derived from literature in political psychology and public opinion (e.g., Corstange & Marinov,
2012). For reasons we discuss below, it is thus not surprising that statements have a negative
impact in contexts where the international community is viewed as playing an interventionist
role in support of a non-democratic government (as in Jordan), and they are less influential
where the international community is seen as less engaged in shaping elections and upholding
authoritarian incumbents (as in Tunisia). Where the West—and by extension EOs—are viewed
negatively, election observation may have unintended, negative consequences.
We proceed as follows. We begin in the next section by reviewing insights from the
literature on how election observation impacts citizens. In the third section, we explore
differences between Jordan and Tunisia and consider why this should increase our confidence in
the generalizability of the findings. The fourth section presents the survey experiment. The final
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section concludes with implications of these findings for both the study and practice of election
observation, and for international interventions more broadly.
Impact of Election Observation: Election Processes, Election Day and Legitimacy
Scholars and practitioners have increasingly recognized that election observation may
influence elections in the lead-up to Election Day, on the day itself, and in the process that
follows; yet, they have much less to say about how statements affect public opinion within the
monitored country. There is some evidence that EOs contribute to clean elections on Election
Day, but their presence may have negative effects on the overall political environment. Looking
at national legislative and executive elections from 1975 to 2004 across 182 countries, Kelley
(2012) argues that election observation is associated with improved election quality in terms of
being considered internationally acceptable, fewer reported electoral irregularities, and more
frequent turnovers in power. Where observers are present, they appear to reduce voter
registration fraud (Ichino & Schundeln, 2012), suspicious turnout rates (Sjoberg, 2012; Asunka,
Brierley, Golden, Kramon & Ofosu, 2013), and the incumbent candidate’s vote share (Hyde
2007; Enikolopov, Korovkin, Petrova, Sonin & Zacharov, 2013).
However, election observation is also associated with negative effects on domestic
institutions, governance, and freedoms in the observed country (Simpser & Donno, 2012).
Election monitoring may encourage strategic manipulation by parties who wish to thwart
elections, and an increased probability of opposition party boycotts (Beaulieu & Hyde 2009).
Even on Election Day, EOs may simply push fraud to the polling stations where they are not
present (Ichino & Schundeln, 2012; Asunka et al., 2013). Yet, because this research is among the
relatively few studies done on the effects of electoral observation, with some showing
contradictory results, more research is needed.
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Practitioners and scholars have largely overlooked questions of how observer statements
affect domestic public opinion after elections. The act of releasing a statement implies
a rather common sense notion that election monitoring statements shape domestic populations’
views of their elections in a straightforward way: positive statements should increase electoral
legitimacy while negative ones should decrease it. 1 For instance, a National Democratic Institute
election monitoring guide declares that in order to have maximal impact, observer groups must
get their results out quickly as “citizens want to know whether the election is ‘going well’ or
‘going badly’ on election day” (Estok, Nevitte, & Cowan, 2002, p. 84). The UN’s “Declaration
of Principles for International Election Observation”—which most monitoring agencies have
signed—links the reporting of observation findings with the promotion of public confidence in
the elections (United Nations, 2005, p. 2). Much of the literature on election monitoring follows
this lead. For example, Hyde highlights that while not all domestic actors will agree on the
necessity of international election monitors, their statements are usually taken seriously.
Governments that “receive negative reports fail to signal to both domestic and international
audiences that they are holding plausibly democratic elections” (2017, p. 13). Similarly,
Carothers cautions that, “A sharp condemnation by foreign observers of a flawed election could
precipitate serious violence or political instability” and that observers may end up avoiding such

1

Literature on the influence of cue sources suggests that political information has a greater

impact when the recipient trusts the messenger or when the message goes against the sender’s
interests and thus seems more credible (Dragojlovic, 2015; Weber, Dunaway & Johnson, 2012).
Surveys conducted in Jordan do not allow us to test this hypothesis, although we plan to test it in
a separate paper on Tunisia.
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statements out of fear of their potential negative effect on public opinion (1997, 25). On the other
hand, scholars assume that incumbents seek a positive statement from international monitors in
order to gain legitimacy, presumably among both international and domestic audiences (e.g.,
Rich, 2001, pp. 26; Kelley, 2012, pp. 7-9; Hyde & Marinov, 2014, pp. 331).
In a rare but important step toward evaluating the impact of observers’ statements on
citizen perceptions, and one worth discussing in detail, Bush and Prather (2017) test the impact
of positive and negative electoral monitoring statements on the public’s perceived electoral
credibility. In a survey experiment conducted shortly after the 2014 Tunisian election, they find
that statements have, on average, a small but statistically significant effect in the expected
direction: a positive statement yields a small improvement in perceived electoral credibility and
the negative statement a small decrease. They also find evidence of heterogeneous effects;
among those who supported Ennahda, the losing party, negative statements led to a decline in
perceived electoral quality.
Two theories of public opinion formation may explain these results. First, Bayesian
updating suggests that the impact of statements on respondents’ evaluations depends on the
certainty that citizens have over their assessments. Losers may be less certain than winners in
their own evaluations of the elections, they argue, and alter their assessment to be in line with the
observers’ assessment. Second, motivated reasoning suggests that the negative evaluations of
monitors may simply be more in line with losers’ partisan goals, leading these respondents to see
the elections as even less credible, due to their desire to absorb information with which they
agree. This argument is consistent with findings from a study of Russia by Robertson (2017),
who finds that opponents to the regime were more likely to view election monitors as credible
and, presumably, to incorporate their information into their assessments of elections.
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Bush and Prather’s study makes an important contribution to the literature, but it has
limitations. Their study takes a creative approach to considering the certainty by which voters
hold their beliefs, and thus attempts to test a theory of Bayesian updating. However, the
assumption that Nidaa Tunis voters (i.e., the winning partisans) are more certain in their
assessment than Ennahda voters (i.e., the losing party’s supporters)—the measure of certainty in
the paper—does not necessarily hold. Unfortunately, neither they nor we have the ability to test
the Bayesian theory adequately.
Our study complements and extends Bush and Prather’s study in several ways. Their
analysis is focused only on Tunisia, which limits the generalizability of its findings.
Experimental context matters, as Pritchett and Sandefur (2013) argue after evaluating
experimental outcomes of development programs. In this study, we evaluate the impact of
election observation statements in two very different electoral contexts to consider how context
may mediate the impact of observers’ statements and citizens’ assessments. Our study also has a
longer timeline, examining effects longer after the elections. Bush and Prather find significant
effects of statements immediately following the election in Tunisia, but, in this study, we find no
evidence for effects seven months later. Taken together, these studies suggest that more work
needs to be done to understand the impact of observers’ statements over time. Our work also
helps answer a call for “greater awareness of the domestic effects of international democracy
promotion [in order to understand] how this type of foreign assistance can progress most
effectively” (Beaulieu & Hyde, 2009, p. 410). Finally, our approach to theorizing about voters as
engaged recipients disaggregates two possible effects of statements that Bush and Prather
subsume under the category of motivated reasoning. Literature in the fields of political
communications, media studies, and psychology identify two distinct ways that the engaged
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recipient could be engaged with and their opinions shaped by positive and negative statements.
We distinguish between and test for these two mechanisms—biased assimilation and backfire
effects. Finally, our work complements studies of foreign influence on elections on whether
citizens believe their country should have closer relations with those external powers (Corstange
& Marinov, 2012).
Elections in Jordan and Tunisia
Jordan and Tunisia offer unique leverage for testing hypotheses regarding the impact of
monitoring statements on citizens’ evaluations of their elections in two different contexts. Each
country is demographically characterized by majority Arab, Muslim populations. However, the
2013 Jordanian and 2014 Tunisian elections differed in terms of each country’s relationship with
the international community, particularly the West. Because election monitoring is so closely
associated with the West, and particularly the United States, it is important to consider how
Jordanians and Tunisians express very different attitudes toward Western engagement in their
respective countries. Moreover, the 2014 Tunisian elections were held in the context of
transition, while the Jordanian elections took place amidst continued frustrations over stalled
reforms in an authoritarian regime. These conditions may impact how EO statements shape
citizens’ perceptions of their elections.
Attitudes toward the International Community. At the time of the elections, Jordanians
saw the US as supporting the monarchy and, relatedly, Israel—a political reality that arguably is
more grating to Jordanians than Tunisians, given both the geographic proximity and the presence
of a large population of Palestinian origin in Jordan. Tunisians, by contrast did not so strongly
equate the international community’s engagement with Tunisia as offering support for
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authoritarian incumbents. Jordanians were thus more skeptical of the West’s intentions than were
Tunisians.
Public opinion polls also reflect these differences. In 2012, 45% of Jordanians polled in
the Arab Barometer disagreed with the statement that Americans are good people, compared to
28% in Tunisia in 2013. A similar proportion of Jordanians (45%) disagreed that U.S. culture has
positive attributes, compared 17% of Tunisians. 2 Moreover, 31% of Jordanians (2014) 3 and 14%
of Tunisians (2014) 4 claim to have boycotted Western goods in response to international events
(Benstead & Reif, 2017). However, a rather high proportion of both Tunisians (66%) and
Jordanians (76%) agreed to some or a great extent that foreign interference is an impediment to
reform in their country. 5 When asked about the most important policy the U.S. should take
toward the region, 36% of Jordanians and Tunisians, respectively, said the US should not
interfere in their politics (Arab Barometer, “Wave III”). 6

2

Arab Barometer Wave II (2010-2011) was conducted in Jordan in 2010 and Tunisia in 2011;

Wave III was conducted in Jordan in 2012 and Tunisia in 2013.
3

GLD (2015), Yale University, poll conducted 2014 by Lust, Kao, and Benstead.

4

TPES (2014), poll conducted by Benstead, Lust, Malouche, and Wichmann.

5

“Foreign interference is an obstacle to reform in your country. Agree to a great extent, some

extent, disagree, absolutely disagree.”
6

“What is the most positive policy that the US can follow in our region? Promote democracy;

Promote economic development; Contain Iran; Solve the Arab-Israeli Conflict; Promote
women’s rights; The US shouldn’t interfere.”
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The Electoral Context. The electoral context also differed across the cases. Long periods
of authoritarian rule meant that voters in Jordan and Tunisia generally had little attachment to
political parties and had long believed that their ballots would have limited impact on the overall
direction of the country. Yet, this began to change in 2011. The elections held in Tunisia in 2012
took place in a time of political transition and high uncertainty, while Jordan’s 2013 election
occurred in a context of stasis. In both countries, however, party attachment remained weak, and
“partisanship” had not fully developed.
Jordan implemented minor reforms to its electoral system in the lead-up to the 2013
elections, but they only heightened frustration. Jordanians had long experienced flawed elections,
and the previous polls, held in 2010, were particularly problematic. Electoral observers and the
international community had soundly criticized the electoral process and outcomes (NDI 2010),
and in December 2010, nearly three quarters of Jordanians viewed the November 2010 elections
as not free and fair (43%) or as having minor problems (30%; Arab Barometer, “Wave II”). In
response, the king swore that the previous wrongs would not be repeated (Ibn Hussein 2012) and
established a commission to revise the electoral law. Yet, reforms fell far short of serious change
(NDI 2013). The Parliamentary Election Law, passed by royal decree in July 2012, established
an Independent Electoral Commission and a national list system; however, it retained the SNTV
system, which had been criticized heavily for decades, 7 and did not remedy serious problems of
malapportionment and gerrymandered districts (Kao 2015:47-51).
Frustration was evident in the lead-up to the 2013 elections, with a number of parties and
political groups boycotting. And after the elections, about two-thirds of Jordanians polled

7

Kao and Lust served on the study mission that prepared The Carter Center (2013) report.
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believed that politicians in their community tried to buy votes with gifts, money, or access to
services. 8
Unlike Jordanians, Tunisians believed that the 2014 elections would be free and fair, and
they felt that the polls could determine the country’s direction. Most had positive memories of
the Constituent Assembly elections held in 2011, when campaigns were vibrant; voters flocked
to the polls; and the process was heralded as remarkably successful. 9 Three years later, the mood
was more somber. The transition had been marred by economic decline, political instability, and
terrorism, and citizens were frustrated. Yet, people continued to believe that the Constituent
Assembly “mattered.” In 2014, when asked if it was able to keep the government from taking too
much power in its own hands, 38% of respondents said yes, 29% said no, and 33% did not know
(TPES 2014). Tunisians also viewed vote-buying as much less prevalent. Only 13% said that
they knew someone who was offered money or gifts in return for their vote in this election, and
few said they personally had been offered money (2%) or gifts (2%). People were concerned
about the outcome in the lead-up to the 2014 polls, but they were not resigned a flawed election.
Election Day went reasonably well in both countries. It appeared to leave Tunisians
feeling more confident in the outcomes of their elections than it did Jordanians. Yet, importantly

8

The GLD Jordan 2014 survey, within which the experiments are embedded, found that 62% of

respondents agreed that many of the politicians in their community buy votes in exchange for
gifts, money, or access to services (31% disagreed; 7% refused to answer). Similarly, 62% of
respondents agreed that many people in their community sell votes in exchange for gifts, money,
or access to services (while 32% disagreed; 6% abstained).
9

NDI (2011) and Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly (2011).
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for our study, elections were neither so perfect nor so flawed as to make positive or negative
statements from election monitors seem ludicrous. Turnout was similar in the two elections: 57%
in Jordan and 62% in Tunisia. Domestic and international observers covered both elections
(Appendix 2), and while they reported some localized violence and disruptions (Al-Shibani
2014), there were no major disturbances or problems deemed to have altered outcomes
significantly.
Finally, it is important to note that partisanship is weak in both Jordan as well as Tunisia.
Jordanian political parties have historically been weak (Lust-Okar 2001; Kao 2015), with tribes
often playing the role of mobilizing voters. The 2014 GLD survey in Jordan found that less than
3% of respondents state that they were members of political parties, and only 13% of
respondents who contacted elected officials to seek assistance chose to contact the official
because he or she was a member of a party they support. Similarly, the Arab Barometer finds
that 0.03% of the Jordanian population claims membership in a political party (Arab Barometer,
“Wave III”).
Parties are similarly weak in Tunisia. Only 3% of respondents in a 2014 TPES poll
conducted in Tunisia reported being members of political parties in Tunisia; 2% reported
membership in a Tunisian political party. Moreover, the poll revealed that only 40% thought they
knew the party they would vote for if elections held tomorrow, with 20% leaning toward a
political party and 40% undecided, and there was considerable shifting in party preference
between the 2011 Constituent Assembly elections and the 2014 elections. Finally, citizens have
low trust in political parties in both countries; the 2014 TPES poll in Tunisia found that 61% of
respondents stated that they had very low trust in political parties and 22% had low trust. The
Arab Barometer found in 2010 found that 55% of Jordanians do not trust parties or trust them to
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a limited extent (Arab Barometer, “Wave II”). In short, partisanship should not be overstated in
either Jordan or Tunisia.
Effects of Election Monitoring
We consider three hypotheses. The first is drawn from assumptions in the literature on
election observation and from election monitoring agencies themselves, and it predicts
homogeneous effects. The second two hypotheses are developed from literature in psychology
and political communication, and they propose heterogeneous effects. Our initial assumption was
that these hypotheses should operate similarly in different political contexts. Testing our
hypotheses across two very different contexts, however, allowed us to test this assumption
explicitly. This much-needed test of the generalizability of experimental findings drew these
expectations into question. The study thus lays the foundation for a comparative framework to
better understand how and why effects of monitoring statements vary both within and across
cases.
Homogeneous Effects. As highlighted above, a widespread, implicit assumption
underlying much of the literature and policy programming holds that when EOs report that
elections were flawed, citizens view the elections as illegitimate; when international monitors
report clean elections, the citizens evaluate the outcomes of elections as more legitimate. This
assumption underpins much of the literature linking election observation to boycotts, protests,
and other elite strategies. For instance, Hyde and Marinov (2014: 331) argue that particularly in
political contexts where objective information is limited, opposition groups point to negative
evaluations to mobilize demonstrations and protests. They recognize that some observers may be
more reputable than others, and that international observers may have more impact in some
contexts than others. However, they generally view EOs as providing credible information and
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their impact to be positive or, at worst, disregarded. Based on their reading of hundreds of
observer reports, they argue that even one negative statement from international monitors is
likely both to “cast doubt” on the quality of the elections among domestic populations and
potentially lead to post-election protests, whereas a positive statement from monitoring agencies
will prevent such outcomes (2014: 337).
Thus, Hypothesis 1 argues that voters’ views of the election will be shaped in the
direction of the EO's statements. This would be consistent with Bush and Prather (2017), who
find evidence for small average treatment effects when comparing the positive and negative
treatments.
Hypothesis One. Voters accept and are swayed by positive and negative statements
(Uniform effect). Positive assessments will make citizens perceive elections as being more
representative of the will of the people, while negative assessments will reduce citizens’
perception of the elections’ legitimacy.
Heterogeneous Effects. Research on election observation generally predicts that
statements affect all citizens equally, but research in political psychology and communication
suggests that receivers are susceptible to several types of cognitive biases, and thus that the
effects of statements may depend on the type of voter. As noted above, Bush and Prather (2017)
find evidence for such heterogeneous effects in Tunisia, as does Robertson (2017) in a study of
election monitors’ legitimacy in Russia, and Masoud, Jamal, and Nugent (2016) in a survey
experiment on religious endorsements of women’s rights issues. Our own previous work has
found evidence of similar effects on candidate electability (Benstead, Jamal, and Lust 2015) and
attitudes about human rights issues (Muriaas, Wang, Benstead, Dulani, & Rakner 2018).

16

We examine two heterogeneous effects. The first is what psychologists call “biased
assimilation,” or “confirmation bias.” 10 Research in psychology finds that people tend to
interpret evidence so as to maintain their prior beliefs (Allport, 1979; Lord, Ross, & Lepper,
1979). Thus, recipients are more likely to accept information that is consistent with their beliefs,
to view ambiguous statements as being consistent with their views, and to ignore inconsistent
information. This suggests that statements will impact recipients’ views when they are consistent
with their views, making recipients believe more strongly in, or take more extreme positions
toward, their initial assessment. Citizens discount or counter statements that are inconsistent with
their prior beliefs and thus these statements will not impact their attitudes. Recipients of positive
or negative observer assessments, when these are consistent with their initial beliefs, may view
the elections as even more positive or negative, respectively. Statements that are contrary to their
pre-established positions will have little or no impact on their views of the elections.
Other scholars have built upon this research to show that in processing information that is
inconsistent with their beliefs, recipients may come to hold their original opinion even more
strongly. This is referred to as a “backfire effect”. Information inconsistent with one’s existing
views creates cognitive dissonance, forcing recipients to take more time and effort to process the
information. In the process, they often return to their original convictions and hold them more
strongly than before (Ditto and Lopez 1992; Nyhan and Reifler 2010). For instance, in a dynamic

10

Kunda (1990); Molden and Higgins (2005). Lord et al.’s (1979) shows how people are biased

by prior attitudes. Multiple laboratory (Edwards & Smith, 1996; Miller, McHoskey, Bane &
Dowd, 1993; Zuwerink & Devine, 1996) and field studies (Ahluwalia, 2000; Munro et al. 2002)
confirm this bias.
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process tracing experiment, Redlawsk (2002) finds that subjects take longer to process
information that is inconsistent with their political views and seek out more information
consistent with their views. This leads the respondents to develop stronger support for their
preferred candidate, even after encountering negative information. These studies suggest that
citizens’ attitudes toward the government shape preconceptions about the electoral process and
impact how observers’ statements influence their assessments of the elections. Those who
strongly support the government, when faced with statements that challenge its legitimacy, are
more likely to express stronger beliefs consistent with their initial positions.
Thus, we consider two hypotheses:
Hypothesis Two. Voters accept consistent information and dismiss inconsistent information
(Biased assimilation). Positive statements will lead those who already see the elections as
legitimate to view them as more legitimate, but positive statements will not affect those with
prior negative beliefs toward the elections. Negative statements will lead those who believed that
the elections were illegitimate to see the elections in a more negative light, but they will not
affect those who had positive prior beliefs.
Hypothesis Three. Voters counter-argue inconsistent information, leading to strong effects
in the opposite direction for those who disagree (Backfire effect). Recipients who receive
information that is inconsistent with their views will develop even stronger views in the opposite
direction of the statement.
Survey Experiment
We employ a framing experiment to examine the relationship between messages and citizens’
attitudes toward elections. This allows us to examine how monitors’ statements shape citizens’
evaluations of electoral legitimacy. By doing so in the very different contexts described above,
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we are able to consider how the impact of election statements may vary, depending on the
context of the elections and attitudes toward the West, and to determine the extent to which
findings are generalizable.
The survey experiments were embedded in the 2014 Jordanian GLD Survey 11 and the
2015 Tunisian Local Governance Performance Index (LGPI) survey. 12 These household surveys
of 1,499 Jordanians and 3,659 Tunisians, respectively, were conducted face-to-face by local
teams using tablet computers. 13 We randomly assigned respondents to treatment groups in which
they were given positive, negative, or no statements regarding EOs’ assessments, and then were
asked to rate the extent to which they believed the elections represented the will of the people. 14

11

GLD (2014), poll conducted 2014 by Lust, Kao, and Benstead.

12

GLD (2015), poll conducted in 2015 by Benstead, Landry, Lust, and Malouche. Replication

file for these two surveys will be made available through ICPSR and the project websites.
Studies approved by the appropriate institutional committee and performed in accordance with
the ethical standards laid down in the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki and its amendments.
13

The surveys took about 40 minutes. Survey experiments were embedded in sections on voting

and placed near the beginning of the survey. There is no reason to expect differences in the
surveys due to placement or contamination of questions surrounding the experiment. Further, the
sampling designs differed slightly given different goals of the surveys, but there is no reason to
believe that this affected results. See Appendix 2.
14

Due to a tablet survey application error in Jordan, the three experimental conditions were

allocated only to voters. Voters are those who reported voting in the election under study (i.e.,
2014 election). Thus, we limit our analyses to voters. In Jordan and Tunisia we opted for a ten-
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The negative treatment group received a statement that said observers’ reported that the elections
were marred by problems. The control group received no statement. The positive treatment
group received a statement that observers deemed that safeguards improved the transparency of
the elections (Table 1). Random assignment of the experiments was effective, as indicated by
insignificant chi-square tests of independence between the condition and all other independent
variables in the analysis. (See Appendix 1 for further discussion).
We adapted all statements from actual Carter Center public statements regarding the
Jordanian and Tunisian elections. We chose segments of reports such that statements included in
the question were similar in length across the conditions and in severity of the statement.
Question stems were identical across the treatments and countries. Yet we intentionally chose
wording that was accurate but not identical across the countries.
Some may object to this approach because statements differed slightly across the
countries, given the content of available reports; thus, it is worth discussing in more detail. First,
in order to uphold the highest standard of integrity and ethical research practices, we did not
want to engage in deception. Moreover, we wanted to use statements that conveyed enough
information to appear credible. Thus, we did not simply want to make a general statement, for
instance, that “observers criticized (applauded) the elections.” Real statements allowed us to
satisfy these concerns. Finally, we sought to simulate experiences that could actually occur in the
real world, which is a necessary condition for a survey experiment to have merit (Gaines,
Kuklinski & Quirk, 2006). We carefully considered different design options and chose an

point Likert scale in an attempt to capture more nuance in responses. To ease interpretation, we
transformed the ten-point scales into four-point scales. See Appendix 3.
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approach with high ethical standards and internal validity, even at the potential cost of a modest
impact on our ability to compare across cases.
[Table 1]
Moreover, we chose this approach because of its limited drawbacks. It is common
practice to standardize question wording in cross-national surveys, but consistent wording does
not always ensure consistent meaning (Harkness et al., 2010). At the same time, the extent to
which effects of the statements exist, they do so with regard to the cross-national comparability
of the experiments, not the individual results within each country. If this assumed, though
implicit, wisdom holds, we should still expect that individuals receiving positive treatments in all
countries would be more likely to see the elections as legitimate, and those receiving negative
statements would be less likely to do so.
It is also worth noting that due to logistical considerations, the time lag between the
elections and surveys varied across the countries, with seven months in Tunisia and 15 months in
Jordan. The difference in timing may at first appear to be a weakness of the study, and certainly
it would be ideal to conduct the experiment at different periods following elections, in order to
test how the impact of statements may change over time. However, timing does not explain the
differences in the outcomes reported below. Indeed, to preview results, we find a significant
impact of the statements on attitudes toward the elections in Jordan, where the time lag between
the elections and survey was long, and an insignificant impact in Tunisia, where the time lag was
short. If timing was a factor, we would expect to find larger effects in Tunisia than in Jordan.
Measurement
Testing the hypotheses requires measurement of the respondent’s evaluation of the elections after
receiving a statement—our dependent variable—and of their view of the election’s legitimacy
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before receiving a statement, which we expect to impact how respondents receive the observer’s
statements. Measuring a respondent’s evaluation of the elections following the statement is
straightforward; we use responses to the questions set forth in Table 1 to measure the
individual’s evaluation of the extent to which the elections represent the will of the people. We
measure the individual’s view of the elections before receiving a statement using the individual’s
assessments of the government. (See Table 2). People who are dissatisfied with the government
are less likely to view the elections as representing the people’s will, and vice versa for those
who are satisfied with the performance of the government. We recognize that these views may
have shifted in the period since the election, given more or less adept government performance
after polling, and this measure may represent a retrospective view on election quality. However,
because we aim to examine the impact of statements on the voters’ assessments at the time of the
survey, the measurement is appropriate. It provides insight into the evaluation of the election
when the experiment is implemented.
Finally, it is worth noting that we do not examine the impact of partisanship on the
responses to monitors’ statements. In doing so, we differ from other scholars who have
considered partisanship (Bush & Prather, 2017). However, given the low level and shifting
nature of partisanship in Jordan and Tunisia, discussed above, we focus on satisfaction with
government as the best indicator of support for the regime.
[Table 2]
Results
We examine the hypotheses derived from assumed wisdom in policy and scholarly
literature, as well as social psychology and media studies. To interrogate the first hypothesis (i.e.,
Uniform effect), we examine the average treatment effects of monitoring statements in Jordan
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and Tunisia. The second and third hypotheses (i.e., biased assimilation and backfire effects)
require analyses of heterogeneous treatment effects.
Testing Homogeneous Treatment Effects. We use ordered logistic regression to estimate
average treatment effects of international election monitoring statements. 15 Table A4.1 (see
Appendix Four) compares the effects of negative and positive statements on perception of
election legitimacy to the control group that received no statement from an international
monitoring agency. The first model for each country (1 and 3) presents the effect of the election
monitoring statements alone, while the second model for each country (2 and 4) presents the
effect of these statements including controls for respondent age, education level, and gender, as
well as an additional independent variable measuring satisfaction with the government.
Hypothesis One holds that positive statements would be associated with more positive
assessments, while negative statements would be associated with more negative assessments of
the elections. Yet, in Jordan and Tunisia, no treatment group was significantly different than
others in terms of their perceptions of the legitimacy of the elections, even when controls are
included in the model. Our measure of satisfaction with the government is the only variable that
significantly predicts perceptions of the legitimacy of the elections across the two cases.
Testing Heterogeneous Treatment Effects. To test for heterogeneous effects, we ran
ordered logistic regression models for each country including interactions between measures of
satisfaction with the government and the experimental treatments and we computed the predicted

15

For the sake of simplicity, we do not present models that controlled for age and education

level, but we found neither to significantly affect the outcomes. See Appendix 4 for details.
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probabilities. (See Tables A4.2 and A4.3 in Appendix 4). To ease interpretation, we present and
discuss the results in graphical form.
The graphs show comparisons between a treatment group (receiving a positive or
negative statement) and the control group (receiving no statement). Respondents are grouped
according to their views of electoral legitimacy, as measured by their level of satisfaction with
the current government, measured on a four-point scale: Very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, not
very satisfied, and not at all satisfied. In the graphs, bars that fall below the horizontal axis show
that those receiving the statement are less likely to select the corresponding level on the
dependent variable—i.e., assessment of the elections statement—than those in the control group.
When the bars fall above the horizontal axis, those receiving the statement are more likely than
the control group to state the corresponding assessment.
We find that the extent to which observers’ assessments influence citizens’ evaluations of
their elections varies according to the individual’s satisfaction with the government and by
country. We do not find strong evidence for the uniform influence or biased assimilation
hypotheses. In Jordan, however, the effects are the strongest, and we find strong evidence for a
backfire effect (Hypothesis Three), significant at the p<.05 level. Effects are weak and
insignificant in Tunisia. We argue that the size of the impact is driven primarily by individuals’
initial attitudes toward the elections and toward the messenger.
Uniform Influence (Hypothesis One) and Biased Assimilation (Hypothesis Two). We
find no support for the biased assimilation hypothesis in either Jordan or Tunisia, or the uniform
influence hypotheses. As shown in Figure 1, we find some evidence that the negative statement
influences those who are somewhat satisfied with the government in the direction of the
statement. Jordanians who are somewhat satisfied with the government and receive a negative
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statement are nearly six percentage points less likely to say that the elections are very
representative, and about four percentage points less likely to say that the elections are somewhat
representative compared to the control group (depicted by the top two horizontal bars for the
“somewhat satisfied” group in Figure 1). Moreover, they are nearly four percentage points more
likely to say that the elections are not very representative and more than six percentage points
more likely to say that they are not representative at all, when compared to the control group.
(See the bottom two bars for the “somewhat satisfied” group in Figure 1). These results are
significant at the p≤.05 level. However, it should be noted that the uniform effect should hold
consistently across respondents. That is, the effects should be homogeneous. Since we do not
find this consistent effect across all types of voters, the experimental results in Jordan do not
support this aspect of the hypothesis.
[Figure 1]
Backfire Effects (Hypothesis 3). Rather, the backfire effect hypothesis receives the
strongest support. As shown in Figure 2, the effect is most pronounced in Jordan, where many
citizens are likely to have a visceral reaction due to their perception of external actors’ impact on
their political context. Respondents that received the positive statement about the elections and
who are very satisfied with the government are twenty-six and seven percentage points less
likely to see the elections as representing the will of the people to a very high degree or to some
degree, respectively, compared to those who are in the control group. (See the first two bars in
the ‘very satisfied’ respondent group). Similarly, very pro-government respondents who received
a positive statement are seventeen and sixteen percentage points more likely to view the elections
as not being representative of the will of the people to some degree or to a very high degree,
respectively, compared to the control group. This is shown by the third and fourth horizontal bars
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in Figure 2. (The effects are significant at the p≤.05 level). Receiving a positive statement leads
those who are inclined to view the elections as legitimate to be less likely to state that the
elections are legitimate. This is consistent with the notion that citizens hold prior views and
engage with observer statements.
[Figure 2]
There is limited evidence of an effect of observer statements on Tunisians’ views of
elections. Figure 3 shows no significant results, although the outcomes suggest a potential
backfire effect. For instance, the negative statement increases the likelihood of people who are
not at all satisfied with the government to see the elections as being very much or somewhat
representative of the will of the people and decreases the likelihood by seven percentage points
of them seeing the elections as not representative at all. Among Tunisian respondents who are
very satisfied with the government, a negative statement is associated with a five percentage
point increase in the likelihood that respondents see the elections as very legitimate. Yet, these
results are not significant at conventional significance levels and we suspect they are weaker
because Tunisians do not hold negative views of the West as strongly as Jordanians do. We find
this result despite the fact that the experiment was conducted in Tunisia much closer to the
election and with a larger number of respondents (1,985) than in the other cases. (See also Figure
A1.1 in Appendix 1).
[Figure 3]
In sum, the survey experiment conducted in Jordan and Tunisia draws into question
assumed wisdom about the uniform impact of EOs’ statements and gives reason to expect that
their assessments can have the opposite impact of that intended. As shown in Table 3, citizens
hear and are sometimes convinced by statements, as shown by the homogenous treatment effects
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in Jordan and Tunisia. Yet, statements cause a backfire effect, especially in Jordan, where
western influence on domestic politics is often resented. Some citizens in Jordan hear observers’
statements and adjust their evaluations in the opposite direction of the information that they are
given.
[Table 3]
Discussion
The results are complex and differ significantly across the two countries. We find little
support for the uniform influence and biased assimilation effects, but greater support for the
backfire hypothesis. We also reveal important differences across the countries. This draws into
question the extent to which findings from any single experimental study should be generalized
to other contexts, and highlights the need to consider the factors that explain these differences.
One potential explanation, which we do not believe applies here, could relate to the time
since the election. As noted above, one might reasonably argue that the impact of monitors’
evaluations diminishes over time. As time goes by after elections, individuals have received and
processed information from a number of sources, presumably leading them to develop a settled
opinion regarding the polls’ legitimacy. Given this, we may have expected stronger effects in
Tunisia, where the survey was conducted more quickly after the election, than in Jordan.
The fact that this was not the case is important and suggests that election monitoring
statements may have political relevance long after the elections are held. Timing not only fails to
explain the differential effects of the statements revealed in the two countries, but it appears that
the impact of monitoring statements may diminish over time much less than one originally
expects. Monitoring statements, like other focal points, can be important as much for the
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underlying political message that they send as they are for the direct information about elections
that they contain.
While other rival hypotheses are possible, a second, and we believe more likely,
explanation is found in the attitudes toward the West. The engaged recipient hypotheses are
based on an understanding of the receivers’ prior beliefs about electoral legitimacy, but also on
their attitudes toward the messenger. As discussed above, Jordanians and Tunisians hold very
different attitudes toward the West, and particularly the United States. Specifically, Tunisians
generally hold positive attitudes toward the West, while most Jordanians are skeptical (Benstead,
2017). It is thus not surprising that backfire effects are most significant in Jordan. That is, the
impact of observers’ statements on assessments of electoral legitimacy may depend on the
statement’s content, the recipient’s prior beliefs, and their attitudes toward the messenger.
Finally, it is important to consider the potential concern that the survey experiment
measures attitudes, not behavior. Even if we understand the extent to which statements impact
citizens’ assessments of the elections, does it matter if it does not compel them to act—taking to
the streets, supporting the regime, or otherwise acting in accordance with their belief? We argue
it does. Statements are short-lived but public discourse that surrounds election outcomes shape
subsequent political dynamics. If positive statements induce some citizens to make statements
about the elections that are more negative than they otherwise would make—as they react to
positive assessments from a disliked source—this becomes fodder for the opposition to challenge
incumbents who gain their position through ‘clean’ elections.
Conclusion
The survey experiments conducted in Jordan and Tunisia suggest that EOs’ assessments
of elections may influence respondents, but their impact is neither as strong nor straightforward

28

as is often assumed by scholars and practitioners. Assessments do not uniformly influence
respondents’ evaluations of elections in the direction of the statement. Positive assessments do
not always push citizens to see the elections in a better light, and negative assessments do not
necessarily prompt them to view elections more negatively. This runs counter to the widespread
assumption that citizens are easily swayed by these statements in predictable ways. Observers’
statements have different impacts on respondents, depending on their initial attitudes toward the
government and the political context of the elections.
This is not wholly surprising. Citizens are not blank slates. They have their own views of
the elections and their own assessment of the sources of information about their elections. When
they have strong beliefs about the government, there is no reason to believe that monitors’
assessments change their subsequent evaluations. Similarly, when the information presented to
them contradicts their views, they are not likely to be swayed by assessments, at least not in the
direction of the message. Indeed, if anything, the strongest findings from these experiments
demonstrate that those who dislike the message respond in a contrarian manner; they are more
likely to give negative evaluations when presented with positive assessments.
Policymakers and development specialists, whose efforts are based on the principle of
“Do no harm,” need to take such backfire effects into account when formulating policies. Nongovernmental organizations, international actors, and governments spend billions of dollars
every year funding election monitoring. To a large extent, they decide where to invest based on
their ability to monitor without facing significant political obstacles and the prospects for
democratization. Our analyses, however, suggest that they should also take into consideration
how the local population will respond to monitors. Even the most professional and wellintentioned monitoring organizations can be viewed by the local population as tainted by their
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association with outside (often Western) forces. Practitioners should recognize the extent to
which this affiliation may undermine their message, and consider the risk of backfire effects
when determining how and where to invest time and resources. Until this danger taken into
account, their programs may have the unintended effect of undermining the electoral legitimacy
that they seek to support.
The findings are also consequential for opposition groups. They need to be aware that
negative statements may inadvertently strengthen support for the regime. Where the West is
particularly disliked, there is reason to believe that incumbents have little to fear from the
presence of negative statements. Indeed, negative evaluations may actually help to strengthen
their regime.
These findings have serious implications for the scholarly work on election observation
as well. Many theories linking election observation to political protest, electoral manipulation,
and other factors are based on the underlying assumption that positive statements enhance the
legitimacy of elections and negative statements undermine it. Yet, at least in some cases and for
some citizens, positive statements may make citizens more skeptical about the quality of their
elections, while negative statements may enhance perceptions that elections were effective. In
both theory building and empirical testing, scholars need to be careful about assuming that the
relationship between monitors’ evaluations and citizens’ responses are positively correlated.
Given the importance of democratic transitions and the efforts put into monitoring,
further study is warranted. Until we achieve improved understanding of the impact of EOs’
assessments on citizens’ assessments, we cannot fully understand how election observation
relates to election protest, democratization, and other outcomes. We also cannot determine where
and when to invest resources most effectively. And, despite best intentions, we are stymied in
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our efforts to promote democratic processes that yield results more faithfully representing the
will of the people.
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Tables

Tunisia (Survey conducted May 2015—Following
Oct. 2014 elections)

Jordan (Survey conducted April 2014 --Following
Jan. 2013 elections)

Table 1. Experimental conditions and question wording for the dependent variable
Negative
Treatment

An international organization that monitored the elections said that: “persistent
concerns about vote buying, proxy registration, and other problems marred the
Jordan’s 2013 elections.” To what extent do you believe that the 2013 parliamentary
election results represented the will of the people? Please tell me on a scale of 1 to 10, where
1 is ‘not at all’ and 10 is ‘very much.’ (Scale: 1=Not at all/10=Very much)

Control

To what extent do you believe that the 2013 parliamentary election results represented the
will of the people? Please tell me on a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 is ‘not at all’ and 10 is ‘very
much.’ (Scale: 1=Not at all/10=Very much)

Positive
Treatment

An international organization that monitored the elections said that: “the new
Independent Election Commission...introduced several important procedural steps to
safeguard ballot secrecy, improve electoral administration, and promote transparency
in Jordan’s 2013 elections.” To what extent do you believe that the 2013 parliamentary
election results represented the will of the people? Please tell me on a scale of 1 to 10, where
1 is ‘not at all’ and 10 is ‘very much.’ (Scale: 1=Not at all/10=Very much)

Negative
Treatment

An international organization that monitored the 2014 parliamentary elections in
Tunisia said: “irregularities were reported in a limited number of polling stations,
[including]… illegal campaigning and inadequate…polling staff.” To what extent do you
believe that the 2014 parliamentary election results represented the will of the people? Please
tell me on a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 is ‘not at all’ and 10 is ‘very much.’ (Scale: 1=Not at
all/10=Very much)

Control

To what extent do you believe that the 2014 parliamentary election results represented the
will of the people? Please tell me on a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 is ‘not at all’ and 10 is ‘very
much.’ (Scale: 1=Not at all/10=Very much)

Positive
Treatment

An international organization that monitored the 2014 parliamentary elections in
Tunisia said: “ISIE electoral authorities succeeded in a relatively smooth and orderly
implementation of the elections.” To what extent do you believe that the 2014
parliamentary election results represented the will of the people? Please tell me on a scale
of 1 to 10, where 1 is ‘not at all’ and 10 is ‘very much.’ (Scale: 1=Not at all/10=Very much)
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Table 2. Question wording for the independent variable
Jordan (Survey
conducted April
2014)

To what extent do you feel satisfied with the way the current
government is handling the country’s affairs? Are you: 1=Very
satisfied, 2=satisfied, 3=dissatisfied, 4=very dissatisfied.

Tunisia (Survey
conducted
February 2015)

How confident are you that the new/current government in Tunisia will
perform well? 1=Very confident, 2=confident, 3=not very confident,
4=not confident at all.
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Table 3. Summary of findings

Homogeneous

Heterogeneous

Uniform influence
(Hypothesis 1)

Biased assimilation
(Hypothesis 2)

Backfire effect
(Hypothesis 3)

Jordan

No*

No (Insignificant)

Yes (p<.05)

Tunisia

No*

No (Insignificant)

No (Insignificant)

*Statistically significant in expected direction for some but not most population sub-groups.
Theory anticipates more uniform and statistically significant effects.
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Figures
Figure 1. Jordanians receiving a negative statement, compared to control group

*p ≤ .05. We find evidence that statements affect those who are somewhat satisfied with the
government in the expected direction (see circles). However, since this effect is present for only
one group of respondents, it is inconsistent with the uniform effect hypothesis, which expects
statements to impact attitudes in the same direction for all population subgroups.
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Figure 2. Jordanians receiving positive statement, compared to control group

*p ≤ .05. Evidence for a backfire effect shown by the circles among those who are very satisfied
with the government.
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Figure 3. Tunisians receiving negative statement, compared to control group
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Online Appendices
Appendix 1: Randomization Checks
A randomized block design was used. All tests showed that randomization was effective.
Table A1.1 shows that the 1,260 Tunisian respondents (voters, in the three conditions) were not
randomly assigned to the negative, control, and positive conditions (p<.038), 16 as a result of an
error in the randomization function in the SurveyToGo software that was used in the tablet
administration of the survey. However, as shown in Table A1.2, the conditions were randomly
distributed across the independent variable and all key demographic variables.
Table A1.1.
Randomized block design: Assignment of respondents to control and experimental conditions
(Tunisia)
Negative

16

Control

Positive

Total

28(6.7%)

86(6.8%)

Bizerte Nord

29(6.9%)

Bizerte Sud

23(5.5%)

19(4.5%)

19(4.5%)

61(4.8%)

Menzel Jemil

18(4.3%)

23(5.4%)

19(4.5%)

60(4.8%)

Siliana Ville

34(8.1%)

16(3.8%)

18(4.3%)

68(5.4%)

Bouarada

25(6.0%)

23(5.4%)

24(5.7%)

72(5.7%)

Gaafour

14(3.4%)

8(1.9%)

8(1.9%)

30(2.4%)

Monastir

31(7.4%)

28(6.6%)

34(8.1%)

93(7.4%)

Tebolba

27(6.5%)

24(5.7%)

33(7.9%)

84(6.7%)

Moknine

21(5.0%)

18(4.3%)

20(4.8%)

59(4.7%)

Souassi

14(3.4%)

35(8.3%)

26(6.2%)

75(6.0%)

Ksour Essaf

19(5.7%)

30(7.1%)

27(6.4%)

76(6.0%)

29(6.9%)

3,659 Tunisians participated in the study, however, only 2,090 were assigned to the three

conditions analyzed this paper.
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Mahdia

24(5.7%)

23(5.4%)

20(4.8%)

67(5.3%)

Cité Khadhra

34(8.1%)

23(5.4%)

20(4.8%)

77(6.1%)

Jbel Jloud

22(5.3%)

20(4.7%)

31(7.4%)

73(5.8%)

La Marsa

31(7.4%)

19(4.5%)

24(5.7%)

74(5.9%)

Sekiet Eddayer

20(4.8%)

26(6.2%)

21(5.0%)

67(5.3%)

Sfax Sud

21(5.0%)

25(5.9%)

26(6.2%)

72(5.7%)

Sfax Ville

11(2.6%)

34(8.0%)

21(5.0%)

66(5.2%)

Total

418(100.0%)

423(100.0%)

419(100.0%)

1260(100.0%)

Two-tailed χ2 test show treatments were not randomly distributed across electoral districts
(p<.038).
Table A1.2 shows that the conditions were randomly distributed across the independent variable
(i.e., satisfaction with the government) and key demographic variables, as shown by insignificant
chi-square tests.
Table A1.2.
Randomization of treatment and demographic variables (Tunisia)
Negative

Control

Positive

Male

55.5%

56.3%

52.5%

Female

44.5%

43.7%

47.5%

(N=1260/Mean=.45/Sd=.50)

χ2(2)=1.339(p<.512)

Gender

Interviewer gender
Male

56.5%

56.7%

54.7%

Female

43.5%

43.3%

45.4%

(N=1260/Mean=.45/Sd=.50)

χ2(2)=.4360(p<.804)

Gender stereotypes: Works harder1
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No difference

68.8%

63.3%

64.2%

Woman

17.5%

20.1%

19.7%

Man

13.7%

16.7%

16.1%

(N=1219/Mean=2.50/Sd=.75)

χ2(2)=3.12(p<.539)

Class
Lower

4.1%

5.0%

2.6%

Lower middle

7.7%

7.1%

9.4%

Middle

57.1%

55.8%

59.5%

Upper middle

23.9%

24.1%

19.7%

Upper

7.2%

8.0%

8.9%

(N=1255/Mean=3.23/Sd=.86)

χ2(2)=7.91(p<.442)

Education
No formal education

4.5%

4.7%

4.8%

Primary school

16.9%

14.4%

12.9%

Secondary school

29.2%

36.9%

38.0%

Higher education

49.1%

43.7%

44.3%

(N=1238/Mean=3.22/Sd=.87)

χ2(2)=13.18(p<.214)

Evaluation of government2
Very good

11.8%

13.4%

13.0%

Good

35.3%

43.8%

41.9%

Bad

39.8%

33.6%

33.3%

Very bad

13.3%

9.3%

11.8%

(N=1219/Mean=2.46/Sd=.86)

χ2(2)=10.416(p<.108)

Residence
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Rural

4.4%

4.0%

5.0%

Small town

19.6%

22.9%

23.4%

Large town

42.6%

43.0%

39.5%

Suburb or large city

33.5%

30.0%

32.1%

(N=1259/Mean=.301/Sd=.85)

χ2(2)=3.704(p<.717)

Age
18-30 years

24.4%

25.3%

24.3%

31-40 years

19.1%

19.9%

20.1%

41-50 years

24.2%

17.5%

21.7%

51-60 years

16.5%

20.8%

16.2%

61-70 years

10.8%

11.4%

11.0%

71 years or more

4.8%

5.0%

6.7%

(N=1260/Mean=2.87/Sd=1.51)

χ2(10)=9.920(p<.448)

Two-tailed χ2 test show treatments are randomly distributed across groups.
1
In general, would you say that male or female members work harder to provide services and
represent citizens, or would you say there is no difference?
2
How confident are you that the new/current government in Tunisia will perform well?

Table A1.3 shows that the 954 Jordanian respondents were randomly assigned to the
negative, control, and positive conditions (p<.100).
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Table A1.3.
Randomized block design: Assignment of respondents to control and experimental conditions
(Jordan)
Negative

No statement

Positive

Total

Amman 1

14(4.6%)

21(5.8%)

24(7.9%)

59(6.2%)

Amman 4

18 (5.9%)

22(6.0%)

16(5.2%)

56(5.9%)

Balqa 2

31(10.2%)

34(9.3%)

25(8.2%)

90(9.4%)

Zarqa 3

23(7.5%)

36(9.9%)

30(9.8%)

89(9.3%)

Irbid 1

31(10.2%)

23(6.3%)

26(8.5%)

80(8.4%)

Irbid 8

29(9.5%)

35(9.6%)

27(8.9%)

91(9.5%)

Jerash

33(10.8%)

40(11.0%)

22(7.2%)

95(10.0%)

Ajloun 2

25(8.2%)

38(10.4%)

24(7.9%)

87(9.1%)

Tafileh 1

27(8.9%)

22(6.0%)

26(8.5%)

75(7.9%)

Tafileh 2

27(8.9%)

31(8.5%)

22(7.2%)

75(7.9%)

Ma’an 2

22(7.2%)

33(9.0%)

33(10.8%)

88(9.2%)

Ma’an 3

25(8.2%)

30(8.2%)

30(9.8%)

85(8.9%)

Total

305(100.0%)

365(100.0%)

305(100.0%)

954(100.0%)

Two-tailed χ2 test show treatments are randomly distributed across administrative districts
(p<1.00).
Table A1.4 shows that the conditions were randomly distributed across the independent
variable (i.e., satisfaction with the government) and key demographic variables, as shown by
insignificant chi-square tests.

Table A1.4.
Randomization of treatment and demographic variables (Jordan)
Negative

Control

Positive

49.7%

50.7%

47.5%

Gender
Male
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Female

50.3%

49.4%

(N=971/Mean=.51/Sd=.50)

χ2(1)=.637(p<.727)

52.5%

Interviewer gender
Male

90.6%

90.6%

91.4%

Female

9.4%

9.4%

8.6%

(N=971/Mean=.10/Sd=.29)

χ2(1)=.146(p<.930)

Better at providing services1
No difference

47.8%

48.1%

47.5%

Woman

39.0%

34.4%

37.2%

Man

11.6%

12.3%

11.6%

(N=938/Mean=.63/Sd=.70)

χ2(2)=9.580(p<.296)

Class
Lower

14.1%

13.3%

11.6%

Lower middle

19.6%

17.5%

23.3%

Middle

54.1%

52.6%

54.2%

Upper middle

2.5%

5.5%

3.3%

Upper

9.7%

10.4%

7.3%

(N=968/Mean=2.76/Sd=1.04)

χ2(1)=15.991(p<.192)

Evaluation of government2
Very satisfied

4.8%

6.0%

3.5%

Satisfied

43.9%

38.6%

41.0%

Dissatisfied

29.1%

32.6%

32.4%

Not satisfied at all

22.2%

22.8%

23.1%
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(N=939/Mean=2.72/Sd=1.0)

χ2(1)=4.045 (p<.671)

Residence (N/A)

Age
18-25 years

33.1%

29.3%

30.3%

26-39 years

28.3%

30.9%

31.3%

17.4%

17.4%

22.4%

21.1%

40-59 years

18.4%

60 years or more

20.1%

(N=951/Mean=2.29/Sd=1.1)

χ2(1)=1.965 (p<.923)

Two-tailed χ2 test show treatments are randomly distributed across groups.
1
In general, would you say that male or female deputies are more capable of providing
services and representing citizens, or would you say there is no difference?
2
To what extent do you feel satisfied with the way the current government is handling the country’s
affairs? Are you: 1=Very satisfied, 2=satisfied, 3=dissatisfied, 4=very dissatisfied.

Appendix 2. Survey Design and Electoral System
2015 Tunisian Local Governance and Performance Index Survey (LGPI)
The 2015 Local Governance Performance Index (LGPI) survey was developed by
Lindsay Benstead (Associate Professor of Political Science at Portland State University), Pierre
Landry (Professor of Political Science at NYU-Shanghai) and Ellen Lust (Professor of Political
Science at the University of Gothenburg). The survey was implemented in May 2015 as part of
the Program on Governance and Local Development at Yale University, with funding from the
Moulay Hicham Foundation and Yale University. Dhafer Malouche (Ecole Supérieure de la
Statistique et de l’Analyse de l’Information) served as the survey manager, working in
conjunction with MAZAM.
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The purpose of the study was to assess governance and service delivery at the local level.
It targeted Tunisian citizens of voting age (18 or older). The survey team was composed of six
supervisors and 42 interviewers. After the interviewer training program, the face-to-face multitopic survey was administered in the field in May 2015 to a nationally representative sample.
A multi-stage sampling design was used to first select six governorates (Wilayat) by
probability of selection proportional to size (PPS). Within governorates, the “delegation” that is
the seat of the governorate was selected as a self-representing unit, while two other delegations
were selected at random, also by PPS. We thus obtained a set of 18 municipalities/delegations as
secondary sampling units (SSUs). Given the lack of updated census information below the SSU
level, the selection of TSUs (defined as square half-arc minutes from a spatial grid) was
conducted by gridding each municipality with the lasted nightlight-data from the DMSP-OLS
series. The light intensity of each pixel on the remote-sensing image was used as proxy for the
relative population density within the municipality. Ten TSUs (and a backup unit) were drawn
within each SSU. Finally, the enumerators were sent to 20 randomly selected coordinates within
each TSU. Taking those as starting points and using instructions to conduct a random walk,
enumerators reached and contacted the corresponding households. Within each household,
computer tablets were used to select a final respondent through a “Kish grid” in order to select
eligible individuals randomly within households. Interviewers of either gender proceeded to
interview the randomly selected respondent, whether male or female and then administered the
entire questionnaire using the tablet. This process resulted in 3,559 completed interviews.
Given the larger sample size in Tunisia, the survey experiment included five conditions,
varying both the message and the source of information: (1) a negative treatment group, which
received a statement made by international observers about the elections having been marred by
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problems, (2) a negative, domestic treatment group, which received a similar statement made by
domestic observers, (3) a control group, which received no statement, (4) a positive, international
treatment group, in which an international organization deemed that safeguards improved the
transparency of the elections; and (5) a positive, domestic treatment group, in which a similar
statement was made by a domestic organization. This will allow us to examine the impact of
domestic vs. international observers, although we will do so in a subsequent paper.
Jordan 2014
The National Dialogue Committee (NDC), established as part of a palace-initiated reform
effort in March 2011, recommended eliminating the SNTV majoritarian system and introducing
a two-tiered, open-list, proportional representation (PR) system, dividing the kingdom into
electoral districts based on governorates and increasing the women’s quota The proposal was to
combine an open-list, proportional representation (PR) system at the provincial level (115 seats)
with an open-list system at the national level (15 seats), and to raise the number of
parliamentarians from 120 to 130.
Jordan remained divided into 45 electoral districts for the 2013 elections, but added a
single, national-level district for PR lists. The 45 districts comprise a mix of First-Past-the Post
and SNTV rules in single and multi-member constituencies with a total of 108 seats. There are
quota seats for Chechens and Circassians (three), Christians (nine), and Bedouins (three in each
of three Bedouin areas, for nine total). There were 27 seats in the single, nationwide district.
Seats in this district were filled through a largest remainder, closed-list PR system. Women are
elected to an additional 15 seats through a quota system at the governorate/Bedouin area level.

51

There were approximately 7,800 domestic and 400 international observers for the
Jordanian elections (Carter Center 2013) and 13,422 domestic and 661 international accredited
observers in Tunisia (NDI 2011, p. 17).
The 2014 Jordanian Post-Election Survey followed the country’s 2013 parliamentary
elections and was developed through collaboration between Ellen Lust (University of
Gothenburg), Lindsay Benstead (Portland State University), and Kristen Kao (University of
Gothenburg). Local partnership with an experienced survey implementation firm, Middle East
Marketing Consultants led by Tony Sabbagh, facilitated the translation of the questionnaire into
the local dialect, the creation of a complex sample design suitable for the needs of the study, the
recruitment and training of fifty enumerators and supervisors, and the careful implementation of
the survey in the field. Data collection was carried out 21 April 2014–28 April 28 2014
employing tablet computers in face-to-face household interviews. The enumerators and
supervisors 17 were trained for two days prior to the implementation of the survey, after which
they were sent out into the field in teams of five (four enumerators to each supervisor). Every
attempt was made to have data uploaded to the main database in Amman every evening over
Internet, and Kristen Kao analyzed the results each evening to check for errors or
inconsistencies.
The purpose of the study was to assess political attitudes and behaviors following
parliamentary elections in 2013 among the target population of Jordanian citizens of voting age
(18) or older. To ensure sampling of adequate numbers of respondents eligible to vote in either

17

In the dataset, the first ten surveyors (variable svyr) are actually supervisors whose tablets

were only employed for practice or in times of emergency should another tablet fail in the field.
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multi-member or single-member electoral districts as well as adequate representation of rural, 18
tribal populations under-counted in conventional probability-proportional-to-size sampling, a
purposive multistage stratified sampling design was used with electoral district as the primary
sampling unit. Jordan’s 45 electoral districts were stratified by region (north, central, and
south), 19 size (small and large), and district type (multi-member single non-transferable vote
(SNTV) or single member plurality). 20 Twelve districts were selected, within which 25

18

Defining the terms “rural” versus “urban” is a subjective process. Population density statistics

at the electoral district level for Jordan were unobtainable, so two measures were constructed
from available eligible voter data try to capture the differences between urban and rural electoral
districts.
19

Some scholars note that the culture in the south of Jordan is more akin to that of the Arab Gulf

region, while the culture in the north is more akin to that of the rest of the Levantine region. In
some instances, this means that tribes might be either more or less sedentary and/or reliant on
agriculture versus livestock for their livelihoods. In the modern era, this distinction should not
greatly affect the results of this survey or conclusions drawn from it concerning the current state
of politics in Jordan. There are other notable differences between the different areas of Jordan.
The sample is stratified by region to make sure that these differences are represented.
20

The variable “Sntv” captures the dividing line between multi-member versus single member

districts, the former of which are run under an SNTV electoral system (coded as a “1” in the
data) versus the latter, which are run under a single-member district plurality system (coded as a
“0” in the data).
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households were randomly selected from blocks enumerated in the 2004 census. (See Table
A2.1).
Once in the field, interviewers were instructed to stratify selection of respondents to obtain
approximately equal numbers of male and female respondents, and to select newer buildings in
all replacement interviews in an attempt to gain representation of respondents who live in
buildings constructed after the 2004 census. Kish tables were used to select one eligible
individual within each household at random. Due to the sampling design, results are likely to
show clustering in responses. Attempting to weight the data based on inferences implying
national representativeness are not recommended given the purposive sampling design, however
data analyses should take stratification variables into account.
Interviewers recorded detailed sampling and refusal information on cover sheets
completed for up to two visits to each residence. Incomplete surveys in the dataset are the result
of a variety of issues. Refusals, in which either the person answering the door or the participant
selected by the Kish table refused to participate, make up one type of incomplete survey in the
dataset. A survey in which the participant decided to stop participating halfway through the
questionnaire constitutes another example of an incomplete interview. Towards the end of
fielding, it became apparent that some of the surveys took 20 minutes or less for enumerators to
complete. The researchers conducting the project and the local partner concluded that these
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surveys were too short to be considered to be realistic, thus part of the final two days of the
survey was spent replacing these surveys. 21
A response rate of 79.8% is based on a total of 1,879 residences visited and 1,499
completed interviews. Among these visits, 7.3% interviews are incomplete due to empty, closed,
or non-residential units; ineligible respondents; or other reasons. Another 13.6% are incomplete
because respondents refused to participate in the survey. Finally, 12% of the interviews were
marked incomplete because they fell short of the 20-minute threshold established to verify that
the interviewer did not rush through the interview, so as to call the validity of the interview into
question.

Table A2.1.
Descriptive statistics for the electoral districts in the survey (Jordan)
District

21

Region

Sntv

Seats

N Sample

% Sample

Ma’an 2

South

1

1

119

7.9

Tafileh 2

South

1

1

118

7.9

If the interview took less than 20 minutes, it is marked as incomplete under the variable

“complete.” Analyses of this dataset should be carried out keeping these issues in mind, dropping
these surveys from analyses where appropriate.
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Ma’an 3

South

1

1

127

8.5

Tafileh 1

South

0

3

136

9.1

Zarqa 3

Central

1

1

127

8.5

Balqa 2

Central

1

1

124

8.3

Amman 4

Central

0

3

132

8.8

Amman 1

Central

0

5

114

7.6

Irbid 1

North

0

5

124

8.3

Ajloun 2

North

1

1

124

8.3

Irbid 8

North

1

1

128

8.5

Jerash

North

0

4

125

8.3

Appendix 3: Inspection of Data to Develop Coding for Dependent Variable
Following the procedure recommended by Long and Freese (2004), a visual inspection of the
distributions, informed by the logic of voters’ possible thought process, was combined with
modeling the outcomes as a multinomial logistic model. Each outcome was tested on a pairwise
basis for differences with only treatment to inform recoding of the 10-point Likert scale into a 4point scale. This simplification eases interpretation. The multinomial logit results suggest that the
extreme ends of the scale are different from the each of the next three levels, and that there is a
break in the middle of the scale, with not much difference between the 5 and 6 category. Long
and Freese suggest collapsing categories informed both by the multinomial logit results as well
as theory and practical considerations, so while separating out the extreme ends of the scale and
grouping all levels (2-5, and 6-9), there would be insufficient numbers of cases in the extreme
categories, so levels 1 and 2 in the 10-point scale are coded as “1” while 9 and 10 are coded as
“4.” This choice of coding makes it less likely that differences will be found between categories
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and thus biases the results against our theoretical expectations, so the evidentiary burden is
higher with this conservative coding. Histograms for the recoded scales follow.
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Distributions by treatment group (Tunisia)
CONTROL

NEGATIVE

POSITIVE

VOTER
S

NON
VOTER
S
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Distributions by treatment group (Jordan)
CONTROL

NEGATIVE

POSITIVE

VOTER
S

NON
VOTER
S

NOT ASKED
NOT ASKED
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Appendix 4. Homogenous and Heterogeneous Treatment Effects
Table A4.1.
Homogeneous effects
Tunisia
(1) (2)
Negative Frame

Positive Frame

Jordan
(3) (4)

-0.396

-0.170

-0.0263

-0.00245

(0.293)

(0.220)

(0.151)

(0.126)

-.0588

-0.0342

-0.190

-0.189

(0.194)

(0.211)

(0.130)

(0.153)

Not Satisfied

Satisfied

Very Satisfied

Gender

Age

Secondary

1.387***

0.686***

(0.200)

(0.192)

1.935***

1.040**

(0.292)

(0.243)

2.802***

1.773***

(0.377)

(0.274)

0.199

0.381*

(0.157)

(0.131)

-0.0053

-0.00237

(0.0061)

(0.00545)

-0.196

0.063

(0.514)

(0.126)

Technical/
Professional

-0.218
(0.160)

University +

Cut 1

Cut 2

-0.130

0.020

(0.330)

(0.135)

-2.303***

-1.283**

-1.187***

-0.631

(0.257)

(0.402)

(0.0997)

(0.415)

-1.039***

0.471

0.301*

0.962

(0.124)

(0.422)

(0.111)

(0.455)
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Cut 3

1.177**

2.630***

1.751***

2.460***

(0.321)

(0.450)

(0.158)

(0.465)

1478

1455

Observations

2045

1985

Standard errors in parentheses; *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < 0.001

Table A4.2 shows comparisons of confidence in the government across treatment groups, the
base category is the interaction between the respondent being very unsatisfied with the
government and the frame.

Table A4.3.
Ordered logistic regressions showing the effect of the treatments across groups with different a
priori attitudes about the government

Control x Not Satisfied

Control x Satisfied

Control x Very Satisfied

Negative x Not Satisfied

Negative x Satisfied

Negative x Very Satisfied

Positive x Not Satisfied

Positive x Satisfied

Tunisia

Jordan

1.928**

0.533**

(0.609)

(0.166)

2.463***

1.251***

(0.502)

(0.232)

3.031***

2.319***

(0.592)

(0.420)

1.652**

0.970***

(0.539)

(0.217)

2.193***

0.810**

(0.525)

(0.206)

3.228***

2.273***

(0.536)

(0.452)

1.759**

0.578†

(0.517)

(0.280)

2.335**

1.079***

(0.600)

(0.226)
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Positive x Very Satisfied

Gender

Age

Secondary School

3.287***

0.894†

(0.706)

(0.497)

0.206

0.410**

(0.185)

(0.122)

-0.00493

-0.000098

(0.0062)

(0.0048)

-0.158

0.0341

(0.301)

(0.175)

Technical School

0.245
(0.243)

University & Higher

Cut 1

Cut 2

Cut 3

Observations

-0.100

0.0248

(0.334)

(0.207)

0.760

0.243

(0.669)

(0.240)

1.000

1.362***

(0.740)

(0.267)

3.161**

2.875***

(0.805)

(0.279)

1985

1455

Standard Errors in Parenthesis
†p<0.10 *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001
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Table A4.3.
Predicted probabilities for the effect of the treatments across groups with different a priori attitudes about the government
Predicted Probabilities of Election Quality Given Interaction of Government Satisfaction and Election Monitor Frame
(To what extent does most recent parliamentary election reflect will of the people?)
Perception of
Current

Not at all

Not very much

Somewhat

Very much

NEG

CTRL

POS

NEG

CTRL

POS

NEG

CTRL

POS

NEG

CTRL

POS

Jordan 2014 0.360

0.402

0.427

0.373

0.365

0.358

0.192

0.170

0.158

0.075

0.063

0.058

Tunisia 2015 0.284

0.358

0.228

0.412

0.405

0.402

0.256

0.202

0.306

0.048

0.035

0.064

Jordan 2014 0.197

0.275

0.266

0.349

0.375

0.373

0.297

0.243

0.249

0.157

0.107

0.112

Tunisia 2015 0.095

0.074

0.086

0.283

0.242

0.267

0.462

0.483

0.472

0.161

0.201

0.175

Jordan 2014 0.219

0.157

0.181

0.360

0.320

0.339

0.282

0.326

0.309

0.140

0.197

0.171

Tunisia 2015 0.057

0.044

0.050

0.203

0.168

0.184

0.492

0.487

0.491

0.248

0.301

0.275

Jordan 2014 0.068

0.065

0.224

0.197

0.192

0.362

0.352

0.350

0.278

0.383

0.393

0.136

Tunisia 2015 0.022

0.027

0.021

0.093

0.111

0.089

0.414

0.441

0.405

0.471

0.422

0.485

Very Negative

Negative

Positive

Very Positive

Note: Probabilities are calculated following ordered logistic regression using SPost13 package over subgroups of respondents falling into each category of satisfaction
with current government, with means of other control variables allowed to vary by subgroup (Long and Freese 2004). Chart does not indicate statistical significance.
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Figure A1.1.
Tunisians receiving positive statement, compared to control group

Figure A1.1 shows no significant effects for any population sub-group in Tunisia.
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